Statements and Opinions
The Gaza-War – Latest Chapter in a Never-Ending Conflict. Extract from a Presentation at the “Launch of the Peace Report 2009. Key Challenges for European Policy: The Case of Palestine”, Hosted by ISIS Europe, 23 July 2009, Brussels
Dr. Margret Johannsen
Like many of today’s asymmetrical wars, the
violent conflict between Israel and the Palestinians
will not be resolved by military means. In this case,
victory for one side and defeat for the other are
inconceivable because the international community
will not tolerate a military solution where the law
of the strongest prevails. Experience has shown that
despite its clear supremacy Israel is not in a position
to force the Palestinians to accept its conditions
for an end to the conflict.
The restraint that Israel, as part of the West, has
had to observe after 1967 has in turn enabled the
Palestinians to persevere and resist the occupation.
Under the prevailing conditions and with the conflict
under constant scrutiny, the Palestinians could not
be defeated. On the contrary, the international community
not only provided legitimacy to their cause, but saw
to it that they somehow survived the many catastrophes
that befell them. On the other hand, Israel for its
part has not had to defeat the Palestinians and win
this war in order to expand its control of territory.
From the outset of the conflict, the seizure of territory
by administrative means has been the civilian equivalent
of territorial expansion by the means of war. Between
wars, the bulldozer took the place of the tank.
In light of these observations, this conflict could
just simmer on, with sporadic violent eruptions and
mass media coverage, and its powerful symbolism continuing
to supply energy to other conflicts in the Middle
East and beyond. The alternative to such intractability
is a Palestinian state, where Palestinians can actively
exercise self-determination as a people. Statehood
alone, through a declaration of independence and international
recognition, will not suffice. It is widely agreed
that for a Palestinian state to be viable it needs
a functioning economy, geographic contiguity and control
of its own borders. The absence of any of these features
will make it vulnerable and dependant and will threaten
its long-term survival. As a failing state it will
fall short of establishing peaceful relationships
with its neighbours. What is maybe not so evident
is that the Palestinian state also needs legitimacy
in the eyes of its citizens. Palestinian Self-determination
in a comprehensive sense that includes popular legitimacy
must be considered the core of a strategy to end the
conflict.
Unfortunately, the split between Fatah in the West
Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and two authoritarian
regimes in the making in both territories, there not
only prevents a stable ceasefire between Israel and
Hamas, but also spells disaster for a solution to
the Palestine conflict that is deserving of the name.
A negotiated ceasefire would require a commitment
by Hamas to enforce a halt to the rocket fire from
the Gaza Strip and to the smuggling of weapons, in
return for an end to Israel's military activity in
the Gaza Strip and a lifting of the siege. However,
the prospects even for such a modest agreement to
be stable are dim as long as the Palestinian schism
continues and both sides, Israel and Hamas, have different
and contradictory goals and expectations concerning
a ceasefire.
The ceasefire of 2008 is a case in point. It was doomed
short-lived because it was designed by the two parties
not as part of a strategic dialogue aiming at establishing
trust and advancing a political settlement, but to
promote totally conflicting strategic interests. Israel
sought to prevent the security tension in the Gaza
sphere from obstructing the political process that,
as part of the effort to promote a comprehensive settlement,
aimed at delaying the advance of Hamas towards the
Palestinian political helm. Hamas for its part hoped
the lull would ease the consolidation of its hold
on Gaza, essentially at the expense of Israel's political
partner – the Fatah-led PA.
So even if the parties can agree to renew the ceasefire
of 2008 a future agreement will not prevent yet another
escalation as long as the split between Hamas and
Fatah continues. Because the split causes both factions
to use the Israeli-Palestinian arena as a battleground
for their power struggle. The detention of civilians
in the West Bank by the Preventive Security Services
and the Palestinian General Intelligence may convince
Israel that those services, whose training and mission
are defined by the war on terror, can prevent Palestinian
violence against Israel. But as these practices target
the Palestinian opposition only, they are also part
of the Palestinian power struggle. And the same is
true in Gaza. Rockets from the Strip may land on Israeli
soil, but politically they target President Abbas.
They aim to withhold from him any achievement in the
negotiations with Israel and thereby weaken the PA.
However, power sharing is not only required for a
Palestinian leadership to be strong enough to “deliver”
what Israel values most, i.e. security. To accept
Palestinian statehood only under the condition that
bothersome actors remain outside of the state’s
structures is a formula for failure. The reasonable
recommendation to the international community would
therefore be to encourage Palestinian unity and then
engage Hamas as an integral part of a legitimate Palestinian
government – not unconditionally, but endorsement
of the two-state solution in line with the Arab League's
Peace Plan of 2002/2007 would not be asking too much
from Hamas – or too little for Israel. Such
acceptance would include financial support, even if
Hamas remains on the EU’s list of terror organizations.
A Palestinian unity government and a negotiated ceasefire
with Israel, taken together, could facilitate a process
leading to the removal of Hamas’ political wing
from this list.
Contact:
Dr. Margret Johannsen
Download Document
|
