

More security for less liberty? Arguing for counterterrorism measures: a comparative study

International Studies Association Annual Convention 2011

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Abstract

This paper presents the preliminary findings of a research project analysing the way in which the nature and the necessity of taking certain counterterrorism measures with an impact on human rights are framed in the EU, the Russian Federation and the USA. The analysis aims at identifying patterns of argumentation, comparing argumentative structures and identifying framing mechanisms with the potential of increasing persuasiveness, in particular the reference to cultural norms, values and narratives. The methodology employed is frame analysis applied to political statements, discourses and other types of 'public speech' communicated by the main executive institutions. The first part of the paper details some methodological considerations, while the second part goes deeper into the actual analytical process, including data collection, sampling and data analysis. The final part presents some preliminary results – general trends and country comparisons along major categories. The empirical and normative relevance of this paper relates to the increasing probability that, should arguments converge, a global change of balance between security and liberty might occur, through a gradual change in, or erosion of the international human rights regime.

A report released in 2009 by the International Commission of Jurists, *Assessing Damage, Urging Action*, reached worrying conclusion on the deterioration of the human rights regime all over the world as a result of post-9/11 counter-terrorism legislation and policy measures: "This report catalogues, with deep concern, the extent to which the responses to the events of 11 September 2001 have changed the legal landscape in countries around the world. It documents how States have reacted to the threat posed by terrorism and concludes that as a result of the cumulative impact of counterterrorism policies that are being pursued, the international legal order based on respect for human rights, built up painstakingly during the second half of the last century, is in jeopardy...the formulation and implementation of counter-terrorist policies, established principles of international human rights and humanitarian law are being questioned and at times ignored, not only by regimes whose record for doing so is well known, but also by liberal democracies that used to be in the forefront of promoting and protecting human rights," (ICJ, 2009: 1). The report mentions several areas of concern: methods of collection and use of intelligence, the increasing power of intelligence agencies, abuse of preventive measures in criminal law, methods of arrest,

detention, interrogation and trial, extended anti-terrorist legislation and what they call ‘a culture of secrecy’ impregnating intelligence and judicial processes. These and other problematic counter-terrorism measures have constituted the object of numerous analyses and reports, originating from both the civil society and the academic community. Their great majority have however either a legalistic approach or a broader political orientation of the nature ‘checks and balances’. Language and in particular argumentative speech supporting these specific measures has remained relatively off-radar, with the exception of isolated analyses of individual, most controversial topics such as torture (Liese, 2009). Analysing argumentative speech is most relevant not only in order to understand how and why the necessity for exceptional measures is constructed and brought out to the public, but also to assess the likelihood that new normative expectations will emerge and become settled. Starting off with the established norm emergence mechanism of concurrent arguments over time (Adler and Haas, 1992, Haas 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), it appears logical to investigate the same mechanism the other way around, i.e. explore the way in which, especially nations with a certain global weight, argue for the introduction of exceptional measures and at the same time for the relaxation of human rights standards involved and see whether there are similarities in argumentation likely to result in the deterioration of the normative regime.

This paper presents the methodological, analytical framework and some preliminary results of a currently running project *Subjecting Freedom*, which explores political arguments put forward in the EU, the Russian Federation and the US in favour of introducing, or justifying already introduced counter-terrorism measures with restricting effects on human rights and fundamental freedoms. The choice of these three case studies is based on two considerations: first, the relative weight in political and economic terms, and second, the perceived and promoted role of ‘human rights defenders’ associated with Europe and the United States. The first part of the paper details some methodological considerations – the type of frame analysis used and the reasons for this choice over other analysis methods. The second part goes deeper into the actual analytical process, including data collection, sampling and data analysis. The final part presents some preliminary results – general trends and country comparisons along major categories. Complete comparative results and time series will follow during this year subsequent to the completion of the coding process.

1. Methodological considerations or ‘how to analyse CT-HR political speech’

The methodological approach considered best suited for the undertaking of analysing argumentative political speech in the area of counter-terrorism measures impacting on human rights (CT-HR) is frame analysis, sourced in the social movements framing theory. Alternative approaches, such as securitisation and frame analysis in media studies were found less suited due to several reasons outlined below.

Frames are “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Goffman, 1974). In an alternative conceptualisation, collective beliefs or ‘thought-world’ (Oberschall 1989) are “a structure of classifications and distinctions by means of which information gets framed, stored, and retrieved in organised meaning-bundles for thought and action” (p. 13); they are social, shared, and exist independently of the individual (Klandermans, 1992). Frames and framing have been already employed in the context of norm creation (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and are considered essential in the first stage of the norm life cycle: “Norm entrepreneurs devote significant attention to constructing a suitable cognitive frame in order to persuade target states...to embrace the normative idea they support. Frames are therefore seen as a key means by which advocates impute social knowledge into their communicative acts,” (Payne, 2001: 43). Eriksson and Noreen (2002) argue for the use of, among others, framing theory for threat agenda setting. They argue in fact that categorising something as ‘security threat’ or ‘securitisation’ is a form of ‘threat framing’ (see also (Vultee, 2011) with regard to securitization frames used in the media). The securitisation literature has itself produced a catalogue of conditions for securitisation moves to work, yet of a relatively general nature and little suited as methodological tools for analysis. Frame analysis allows exactly that, the “capture and description of relevant contents and argumentation patterns in discourse” (Dunn, 2004).

Frame analysis has been used in media studies and social movements. A series of considerations argue for the choice of the latter. First, frame conceptualisation in media studies is somewhat limited, as it only refers to a process of ‘selection’, rather than formulation anew. Thus, here, “[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993: 52). The conceptualisation of social movements frames is more precise in terms of identifying framing functions: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. Incidentally, in a securitisation context, threat frame analysis also refers to the same three functions (Dunn 2004, 2005). In social movement theory, frames allow the conversion into a social problem of a phenomenon whose origin was previously attributed to natural factors or individual responsibility (Melucci et al., 1989, Snow, 1986); frames identify causes, provide solutions and motivate by showing connections of a certain problem with other events, social groups or individual life (Benford, 2000, Williams, 2004). And, as Donati (2001) argues, in general, in political discourse, action-frames (causes, conditions, consequences) rather than object related frames will be found (p. 162).

Second, frame analysis in social movements has a clear focus on the act of ‘persuasion’ rather than ‘agenda-setting’. In media studies, framing is usually understood as a process of selecting certain issues and affording them more salience, or in terms of angle, perspective or points of view for interpretation (King, 1997, Entman, 1993, Nimmo and Combs, 1985, Norris, 1995). In social movements, movement “adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and *urge others to act* in concert to affect change” (Benford and Snow, 2000a,

emphasis added). And, as Klein (2010) argues, “political speech and writing in democracies [is] by far mostly ‘persuasive’, which means, it aims at convincing others and strengthening existing convictions,” (p. 7)¹. Furthermore, as Finnemore (1996) argues, “normative claims become powerful and prevail by being persuasive,” (p. 38). Third, in methodological terms, frame analysis in media studies works deductively with meta-frames: content frames or masterframes and generic frames and therefore does not allow for conceptual innovation. Chong and Druckman, (2007) argue that ready-made dictionary frames are inferior to manual coding guided by prototypes, precisely because one cannot discover new frames, (p. 108).

Finally and most importantly, social movements frame analysis allows for the identification of the *conditions* under which frames are likely to ‘work’, i.e. have the potential of convincing and even changing existing convictions. This ‘frame resonance’ has been conceptualised in the specific context of social movements and with application to the power of mobilising constituencies. There is, however, no reason why this scheme might not be applied in the context of securitisation moves, since the short-term purpose is the same, that of persuading and potentially changing existing frames in the respective constituencies. The concept of resonance has been invoked also within research on norm establishment, where it has been found that norm entrepreneurs frame normative ideas with a view of resonance with the audiences (Nadelmann 1990: 482). And, “the idea of frame resonance potentially explains both the persuasive success of these instruments and their social function in the persuasive process. Norm-building, to reiterate, depends upon persuasive communicative acts. If particular frames resonate, they are properly viewed as key rhetorical tools used by advocates to create support for normative ideas,” (Payne, 2001: 44). It makes therefore sense to look at frame resonance the other way around as well, in the case of norm erosion.

In social movement theory, the conditions for the mobilising potency of frames or their ‘resonance’ have been subsumed under the criteria of *credibility* and *salience*. Credibility is in its turn determined by frame *consistency*, *empirical credibility* and the *credibility of the frame articulators* (Johnson, 1997, Benford and Snow, 2000a). *Salience* refers to the *centrality*, *experiential commensurability* and *narrative fidelity* of the frame in relation to the targets of mobilisation (Snow and Benford, 1988). Social movements studies have testified to the incidence of frame consistency in ensuring credibility (Zuo and Benford, 1995, Gerhards and Rucht, 1992, Johnson, 1997) and to the importance of empirical credibility (the resonance with everyday experiences) (Babb, 1996, Erwin, 1993, Zuo and Benford, 1995). With regard to the latter, as Ellingson (1995) argues, events “... may change the underlying ideas or beliefs that make up the discourses and frames used by movement actors, resignify which set of collective beliefs are salient, and alter the meaning of actors’ interests—all of which affect the power of a particular discourse or frame” (p. 136). Another factor influencing the degree of resonance has been identified in social movements as the credibility of the speaker (Hovland and Weiss, 1951, Aronson and Golden, 1962), the speaker’s status and knowledge, expertise about the issue (Hass, 1981, Hovland, 1953, McGuire, 1985, Fiske and Taylor, 1991, Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2002, Benford and Snow, 2000b),

¹ One of the problems that might emerge in the case of analysing political speech in dictatorships is of course the uselessness of frame analysis. As Klein argues on the same page, “In dictatorships, the direct speech mode dominates, with anordnung, order and threat”.

as well as his/her reputation and likeability (Benford, 1993, Slater and Rouner, 1996, McCaffrey, 2000, Vanderford, 1989). Furtell (2003) has observed this aspect also in relation to framing in general: “expert authority may powerfully shape the contours of framing activities. The language of science and expertise can stall efforts of non-experts to understand what is going on. Lay citizens have to place a great deal of faith in the authority and judgement of experts,” (p. 380).

Culture is an important element in frame analysis, since frames are already present in the memory and culture of the actors. As Donati (2001) argues, “cognition is nothing else but re-cognition..., and actors give sense to things through their “re-cognition” as elements of a meaningfully ordered world. A consequence of that is that nothing can be perceived what is not already known; that is why the meaning needs to be always sought in the existing culture,” (p. 150). Cultural resonance or narrative fidelity, as a resort to culturally embedded frames, has been emphasised by several authors in social movements theory (Park, 1998, Berbrier, 1998, Kubal, 1998, d'Anjou and Male, 1998, Noonan, 1995, Zuo and Benford, 1995). Actors and movements will attempt to tap into these frames to be persuasive: “competing and opposing actors attempt to mobilise consensus by anchoring their definitions of the situation in the collective beliefs of various social groups” (Klandermans, 1992: 87). The cultural material is essential for framing, through the existing beliefs, values, practices, myths, narratives and meanings, or the ‘tool kit’ (Swidler, 1986). As Benford & Snow (2000) observe, “the more culturally believable the claimed evidence, and the greater the number of slices of such evidence, the more credible the framing and the broader its appeal,” (p. 620). This means that, on the one hand, the more strata of cultural narratives covered, the more credible the framework and on the other, that the specifics of the cultural narratives belonging to any one group will influence which issues will be tackled and how they will be framed.

2. The analytical trail

In a first stage of the analytical process, a list of keywords (see Annex 1, Figure 1) was established, reflecting counterterrorism measures with impact on human rights, as sourced in the literature and human rights organisations reports (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) for the years 2001-2010. This list was then used to search and save relevant texts from official websites of executive government and, for the case of the Russian Federation, complemented with additional data sources – the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russian Newspaper) and the database Public (see Annex 1 Figure 2 for the complete list of data sources). This was necessary due to the relatively small number of relevant texts existent on Russian official websites. The list of search keywords was also modified and adapted for the case of the Russian Federation, due to language and political speech particularities. Apart from the keyword and source relevance, the criteria for the choice of texts were additionally the speaker, who had to be the highest representative of the respective executive institutions of government, and the type of speech, which had to be direct. Here again an exception was partly made for the Russian Federation, in which case also indirect speech of the respective politicians present in media articles was considered, due to the relatively small number of

texts containing direct speech. The current overall number of texts by case are: USA 1005, EU 262, Russian Federation 315; the final number will increase slightly by the end of the project in order to cover the entire period up to the end of 2010 (the initial search was concluded in the summer of 2010).

The second stage of the analysis process implied attribute coding – attaching variable values or attributes to each text, (see Annex 1, Figure 3 for the complete list of attributes). Maxqda automatically creates and attaches 7 attributes to all imported texts: Document group, Document name, Creation date, Number of coded segments, Number of memos, Author and Bytes. Additionally, we created and attached to all texts 6 additional attributes in order to facilitate comparative analysis based on these characteristics at a later point: Country, Institution, Document Type, Date of the document, Source and type of Receiver. Figure 4 shows a snapshot of the EU document group with attributes attached.

Based on a sample of 10% of the EU and US document groups, an initial Codebook was created. This was done semi-inductively, starting with a given frame structure as developed in social movements theory and then ‘filled’ with concrete codes as emergent from the actual texts. Its first part, Codebook A (see Annex 1, Figure 5) covers the main frame components – diagnostic, prognostic and motivational, i.e. definition of the problem, its cause, solution and justification. Some modifications were brought to facilitate the analysis process, including the emergence of new relationships. One was to include denominations and attributes (in the sense of characterisation) of the victim in order to make comparisons to those of the enemy. The relevance of this is not only in descriptive terms, but also as supporting function for arguments assuming an essentially qualitative difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and therefore the infliction of a differential treatment to ‘them’. In other words, because the terrorists are different to us, indeed endowed with negative, even diabolical features, as opposed to innocence, the argument goes, it is imaginable for certain protective norms that apply to ‘us’ to not be applicable to ‘them’. Apart from the catalogue of counter-terrorism measures, coded as ‘solution identifier’, a series of additional categories were included under the larger category of ‘solution’, namely the general attitude of the speaker towards the solution, the type of justification (if) presented in the immediate vicinity of the measure, grand strategies, alternatives and the authority in charge.

Part B of the Codebook is based on the 6 framing salience and credibility criteria (see Annex 1, Figure 6). Frame centrality reflects cultural and political values as embedded in the larger belief system: main founding ideas and principles, along with political and personal values. Experiential commensurability codes experiences at the emotional level, such as empathy with victims and fear. Narrative fidelity or cultural resonance refers to historical events (also myths), collective memories, and core political values as developed in time – the self-understanding of a state and its mission. Within credibility, frame consistency codes the compatibility between claims and actions in the form of adequacy and success of the means employed. Empirical credibility, namely resonance with everyday experiences, usually refers to the continuous presence of the threat as described by the speakers, as well as evidence of the way in which further attacks were prevented. Finally, the credibility of the frame

articulators refers to the status and knowledge, expertise about the issue, reputation and likeability of the speakers.

3. Preliminary results

The coding process is still ongoing so that the preliminary results presented in the following are only a snapshot and not representative for the whole population of the texts; the analysis is based on 113 EU and US texts (Council Foreign Affairs, General Affairs, Justice and Home Affairs, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Council and Presidencies, US President, Vice-President, Secretary of State and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency); some examples from the Russian sample will be also presented as a means of illustration. The codebook is also in continuous development, as new codes emerge and considering again the particularities of the themes and political speech in the case of the Russian Federation. We use 50-100% double coding to ensure inter-coder reliability, given the complexity of the codebook.

Some of the general trends that already became apparent at this point in the analysis have to do with the overall type of discourse used in the three cases, the definition of the threat and the type of policies deemed appropriate to address it. The American discourse is usually concrete, detailed and rich in types of justification, as opposed to the European one which tends to be more general, abstract and with constant reference to common values and principles. Justification, if at all, is rather of a technical nature. These differences can be traced to several factors: first, the number and nature of the problematic measures. In the American case, they are more numerous than in the European one, where themes usually revolve around data protection. The latter are also relatively less obvious for external, non-specialised audience, as opposed to, for instance, torture or secret prisons. A broader problematique has to do with the limited nature of the EU competences in matters of internal security and foreign affairs. In other words, even if issues having to do with, for instance, conditions of detention or rendition do come up at the national level, they are not something that the EU as such would deal with. Second, the type of documents: EU releases are usually the result of extensive consultation and compromise, which usually leads to general statements, whereas the American ones, be it press conferences or interviews, are not only more personalised, given the source, but also forcibly concrete, since politicians need to give answers to concrete questions. The Russian discourse is altogether different; there is not much justification, but rather the expression of decisiveness to deal with the threat, and deal promptly and effectively. In other words, ‘doing something about’ the threat, and that in a massive and comprehensive way is already a justification in itself. The following citation illustrates these points:

Nevertheless, along with the strengthening of the fight against terrorism via secret services, with regard to law enforcement bodies we are bound to think, and we will think about the improvement of the legal basis providing safety to our citizens. We should think and will think about the development of video observation systems, we will improve explosive detection technologies and the rescue

systems, we will also enhance the notification and informing of citizens. (Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Working Meeting, 30 March 2010)

With regard to the general definition of the threat, there are similarities in that terrorism, and in particular Islamist terrorism is seen as exceptional and global, but also variations in extent and nature: catastrophic vs. different and war vs. crime. The expression ‘war on terror’ is already well known. In the Russian case, the understanding of war goes even further, in that it is less ambivalent and less metaphorical: “Terrorists have imposed us a new reality in which nobody can feel 100 % safe. The society seems not to be prepared to live, as a matter of fact, in a state of war,” (Vladimir Gruzdev, United Russia, Speech, 29 April 2010). For the EU, the types of policy areas considered appropriate go more along the lines of criminal/police/judicial affairs and European integration, while in the American and Russian cases there is more emphasis on military and intelligence. Diplomacy and multilateralism are mechanisms that all three consider appropriate, at least at the level of general discourse.

a) Argumentative structures

Before going into the preliminary analysis results, it imports to present an example of a short coded text in Maxqda, the US President Executive Order from 13 November 2001 establishing military commissions (see Annex 2 for the complete document and Annex 3, Figure 1 for the text image in codes). It illustrates not only the structure of the argument as such, but also the incidence of several resonance elements as predicted in the framing theory. The first paragraph establishes already the credibility of the frame articulator, the President who is endowed with constitutional authority and the status of commander in chief. The following three paragraphs set the scene: the identification of the problem – terrorism as war, the enemy Al Qaeda, the attributes of the threat as ‘grave’ and already invokes the narrative of the 9/11 event with connotations of vulnerability and emotional distress. Further, the situation of continued vulnerability in the context of an enemy objective to strike the US and the solution alternative of another attack with loss of life. The argument goes on with the invocation of the cultural narrative element of global responsibility, together with the solution justification – prevention of further terrorist attacks. After cognitively and emotionally setting the scene in this way, enter the actual solution – military commissions, embedded in a final solution justification: exceptional measures in exceptional times, constructed through the ideas of danger, terrorists as special cases, the eventuality of mass casualties and the imminence of the threat.

b) Patterns of argumentation

Based on the sample mentioned above, an initial comparative analysis for the EU and the USA could be carried out along some of the main categories in the codebook. Overall, the

European arguments for the introduction of the measures of interest are predominantly in terms of ‘operational effectiveness’ (certain measures or powers are necessary in order for intelligence and law enforcement authorities to carry out their tasks), followed by prevention, protection, legality and judicial arguments. The American arguments have a broader spectrum, concentrate under legality and protection, but also prevention and operational effectiveness, and to a lesser extent defence and judicial (see Annex 3, Figure 2). An interesting element, specific for the American case, is the ‘exception’ argument, i.e. exceptional times requiring exceptional measures. Another American specificity is the ‘defence’ argument, which makes sense considering the conceptualisation of the fight against terrorism as ‘war’ rather than ‘crime’ like in the EU. The following two quotes present examples of operational effectiveness arguments, in relation to data retention and the Patriot Act respectively.

The *necessity of having access to traffic data* in such cases was also recently demonstrated in a large international child porn investigation, co-ordinated by Europol. In that particular case, IP addresses of persons who were downloading child pornography of the internet were found by law enforcement in one Member State, and subsequent arrests were made in 12 Member States, based on those IP addresses. However, in five further Member States those IP-addresses could not be linked anymore to individual users, since the relevant data had already been deleted by the Internet Service Providers. (Commission Staff Working Document, Annex to the: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, Extended Impact Assessment, COM(2005) 438 final, Brussels, 21 September 2005, SEC(2005) 1131)

Inside our country, where the war began, we must continue *to give homeland security and law enforcement personnel every tool they need to defend us*. And one of those essential tools is the Patriot Act, which authorizes federal law enforcement to share more intelligence information, to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets. We use these tools to catch embezzlers and drug traffickers, and *we need these tools*, as well, to hunt terrorists. (Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the National Republican Congressional Committee Event Donald E. Stevens Convention Center Rosemont, Illinois, 7 February 2004)

This type of argument usually correlates well with frame consistency, where concrete examples of operational success are brought to convince of the adequacy of the measures. The EU example above makes an analogy with the issue of child pornography and illustrates the success of data retention by concrete examples of arrests. Such examples of operational success are quite customary in discourse, on both sides of the Atlantic. Below two further quotes that show how the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program and the CIA interrogation program have yielded results in terms of plot disruption and an example from the Russian case, related to counter-terrorism covert operations.

TFTP information provided substantial assistance to European governments during investigations into the *Al-Qa'ida-directed plot to attack transatlantic airline flights* travelling between the EU and the United States. TFTP information provided new leads, corroborated identities and revealed relationships among individuals responsible for this terrorist plot. In mid-September 2009 *three individuals were convicted in the UK, and each was sentenced to at least 30 years in prison*. (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Information Note, EU-US agreement on the processing and

transfer of financial messaging data for the purposes of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP), November 2009)

This program has produced critical intelligence that has helped us *prevent a number of attacks*. The program helped us stop a *plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi, a plot to hijack a passenger plane and fly it into Library Tower in Los Angeles, and a plot to crash passenger planes into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London*. And it has helped us understand al Qaida's structure and financing and communications and logistics. (President George W. Bush, Radio Address, March 8 2008)

We do have *concrete results*. (...) The bandit underground of the North Caucasus connected to international terrorists of al-Qaida was substantially shattered. This year, during 10 months only, security services together with other power structures have realized more *than two thousand special operations*, including more than *700 covert-military operations for the neutralization of terrorists and the freeing of hostages*. (FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, Interview, 24 November 2005)

A further example below illustrates with a quote from the former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice the justification of exceptional treatment for detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Common features of exceptionality have to do with the nature of the threat and of the enemy which are not 'conventional' and therefore cannot be warranted conventional treatment.

I meet frequently myself with the head of the ICRC and I think you will find that when the ICRC has questions, we try to give them answers. But *we are in a different kind of war here*. We're in a situation in which we have people who would, not as a matter of collateral damage but *as a matter of design, kill innocent people were they released onto the streets*. And we're simply not going to let it happen. (Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Interview with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on the Jonathan Dimpleby Programme ITV1, Liverpool, England 1 April 2006)

Similarly for Russia:

The international terrorism is a *young phenomenon*. International law does not regulate the juridical aspects of the fight against it in an appropriate manner...Terrorism originates in *an absolutely distinct type of mentality*. Trying to understand it from the point of view of traditional European political culture is pointless. However, this circumstance should not act as an obstacle to a rigid and uncompromising fight against this *evil*. *The paradoxical nature, the unpredictability and the sharpness of the threat of modern terrorism compels to a more flexible application of existing laws*. Here again the casting vote right should belong to the military, instead of diplomats. (Dmitry Rogozin, Duma, Release, 19 August 2003)

This exceptionality argument usually correlates with an 'exceptional' description of the enemy; they are different and endowed with negative characteristics, they are 'killers', and this is set in opposition to the victims who are 'innocent', (see Annex 3, Figure 3 for an aggregate picture of labels attached to the enemy). It appears clearly from there that the appellatives the EU usually employs are technical and neutral, which also correlates with the larger percentage of operational effectiveness arguments they use, whereas the US discourse is highly personalised, pejorative and de-humanising, which becomes helpful in justifying exceptional measures. The Russian discourse rather goes along the lines of the American one, in describing the enemy in pejorative terms:

Moreover, yesterday in Kizlyar there was a terrorist attack, where our comrades died. (...) This is a severe, very severe accident. But, of course, they died protecting our people, have given their lives for common people, and have protected them from *those chums who kill our people in the dirtiest, vile ways*. (President Dmitry Medvedev, Meeting, 1 April 2010)

Another major category of interest is the general attitude towards measures (see Annex 3, Figure 4 for a comparison EU-USA). Here we can observe again a higher variation in types of attitudes on the part of the US, in particular the relatively high percentages under ‘denial’, (such as ‘we do not torture’) and ‘re-definition of the law’, where, based on usually technical considerations, modifications to the existing legislation are pushed. But this is not unknown in the EU either. The quote below illustrates an instance of argumentation for legislative change in view of retention of telecommunication data, passenger data and biometrics and with operational effectiveness in the background. The second quote also pushes legislative change to accommodate the legal continuation of the CIA interrogation programme.

The rules that currently govern our law-enforcement bodies seriously inhibit their ability to protect us against criminals. Information is the life-blood of law-enforcement operations and enables our police and agencies to prevent crimes with the minimum of impact on our daily lives. To tackle organised crime and to stop terrorist groups before they carry out activities they need a clear picture of who the criminals are, what they are doing, where they are and how they communicate with each other. Often that picture is pieced together after the fact. But if we are to be effective in dismantling organised crime groups we must analyse intelligence and information so that we can target our efforts on the most dangerous criminals. However, that need is not always reflected in the rules that we apply to our police. (UK Home Secretary Charles Clarke, Speech to the European Parliament - 7 September 2005, European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg)

First, we have been working throughout the summer, talking to key players *about getting a bill that will enable the [CIA interrogation] program to go forward*, and was pleased that the House of Representatives passed a good bill with an overwhelming bipartisan majority out of their committee, the Armed Services Committee. And I felt that was good progress. And, obviously, we've got a little work to do in the Senate, and we'll continue making our case. (President George W. Bush, Press Conference, The Rose Garden, 15 September 2006).

Russian politicians take a similar stand, again along the lines of operational necessity, or ‘the purpose justifies the means’:

In the face of the terrorism threat, not recognizing the rules and norms of modern civilization, the *citizens of Russia shouldn't remain hostages of inadequate law. The weakness of the legal base can't be considered as a justification for the passivity of authorities when it is a question of threat to life, freedom and civil liberties of the population of the country.* According to an English saying: “If game rules don't allow winning, English gentlemen change the rules”. (Dmitry Rogozin, Duma 19 August, 2003)

c) Main elements of resonance: cultural values and narratives

In the examples above, elements of frame consistency along credibility resonance were illustrated. A somewhat related element is that of empirical credibility, where arguments such as the successful prevention of attacks or, on the reverse, the continuance of the threat as

evidenced by attacks still occurring elsewhere are brought up. The following citation illustrates the frame of imminent danger and urgency of action through the empirical recurrence of attacks: “It's a dangerous world. I wish it wasn't that way. I wish I could tell the American people, don't worry about it, they're not coming again. But *they are coming again*. And that's why I've sent this legislation up to Congress, and that's why we'll continue to work with allies in building a vast coalition, to protect not only ourselves, but them. The facts are, is that after 9/11, *this enemy continued to attack and kill innocent people*,” (President George W. Bush, Press Conference, The Rose Garden, 15 September 2006). A final element of credibility, that of the frame articulators, is particularly observable in the American case, and relates to status, but also the credentials inherent to particular professions and personal features of character. The American president enjoys the status of commander in chief and primary responsible for the insurance of state security, including in the context of the so-called ‘war on terror’. The support rates for George W. Bush up to the end of 2003 never went below 50%, with a historical record of 90% immediately after the 9/11 attacks². In justifying the CIA interrogation techniques in relation to the Geneva Convention standards, the President builds a legitimating frame which shifts the value inherency from the law to the nature of the agents – in line with the values of decency and honor: “Now, the Court said that you've got to live under Article III of the Geneva Convention, and the standards are so vague that our professionals won't be able to carry forward the program, because they don't want to be tried as war criminals. They don't want to break the law. *These are decent, honorable citizens who are on the front line of protecting the American people*, and they expect our government to give them clarity about what is right and what is wrong in the law. And that's what we have asked to do” (President George W. Bush, Press Conference, The Rose Garden, 15 September 2006).

A more complex scheme of argumentation is, however, that relying on salience, in terms of frame centrality – cultural and political values embedded in the larger belief system, experiential commensurability, at the level of emotional level and empathy, and narrative fidelity or cultural resonance: historical events, myths, collective memories, and core political values as developed in time – the self-understanding of a state and its mission in the world. The table in Annex 3 Figure 5 (narrative fidelity) shows how the European argumentation goes overwhelmingly along the lines of political culture, whereas for the US there is a relative even distribution, with a clear emphasis though on historical events. 9/11 comes up in speeches over and over again, also together with other key events such as the defeat of communism and fascism and Pearl Harbour. While Madrid and London also appear in some of the speeches, their assessed usefulness for the argument does not match that of 9/11. This becomes even clearer from the great discrepancy between the EU and the US regarding the percentages allocated to collective memories (loss, number of victims and the impression of vulnerability) related to these historical events. These clearly play a greater role in the American case. The evocation of these events is very emotional and consciously put in relationship to certain measures. The following EU citation illustrates how events are not used in support of any particular measure; if anything, the text then goes on to condemn torture and rendition.

² <http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm>

Modern terrorism means mass-casualty attacks. We have seen them in New York, Washington, Istanbul, Madrid, and recently in London and in numerous other cities around the world...Our people need protecting against it; our governments have a clear responsibility to provide that protection. It is a responsibility that requires governments to make difficult decisions, take concrete action and explain and defend those decisions and that action. (UK Minister of State for Europe, President-in-Office of the Council, Douglas Alexander, European Parliament plenary debate on the presumed use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, 14 December 2005, European Parliament Plenary, Strasbourg)

On the reverse, as illustrated by the following citation, 9/11 with all the common memories of loss sets the scene for the introduction of the CIA interrogation programme.

Good morning. This Monday, our Nation will mark the 5th anniversary of the attacks of September the 11th, 2001. On this solemn occasion, Americans will observe a day of prayer and remembrance, and Laura and I will travel to New York City, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon to take part in memorial ceremonies. Our Nation honors the memory of every person we lost on that day of terror, and we pray that the Almighty will continue to comfort the families who had so much taken away from them. (President George W. Bush, Radio Address, 9 September 2006)

Some paragraphs later:

On Wednesday at the White House, I described for the first time a CIA program we established after 9/11 to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives, so we can prevent new terrorist attacks. This program has been invaluable to the security of America and its allies, and helped us identify and capture men who our intelligence community believes were key architects of the September the 11th attacks.

Annex 3, Figure 6 illustrates an overview of main political principles recurrent in discourse. Several observations can be made at the level of the use of language and prioritisations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the American discourse, as opposed to the European one, refers often to the Constitution, but not international law, to civil liberties but not human rights. Certain phrases reflect policy formulation and prioritisation, such as the rule of law and fundamental values (EU), self-government and founding principles (US). This confirms in a sense the fact that frames are constructed to correspond to cultural and political particularities.

Coming back to the original question stirring up the research process at the basis of this paper: is there any argumentative convergence among the EU, the US and the Russian Federation with regard to counter-terrorist measures impacting on human rights? One problem has to do with the fact that there is not a complete overlap of measures in all three cases, both as a matter of fact, i.e. which measures are introduced, and as a matter of argumentation, for which measures it is considered necessary to present arguments. The sample analysed so far has not displayed convergence *along the same measures*, which however does not mean that once the analysis is completed such convergence will not appear. Another problem mentioned above is the difference in political and overall culture, which necessarily implies differences at the level of narrative fidelity. With regard to this type of frames, some overlap has been observed nevertheless; some values and principles occur in all three cases, yet with different

weights. The clearest instances of overlap, not just in terms of framing mechanisms per se, but also at the level of content, are those of frame consistency and empirical credibility, connected to arguments of operational effectiveness. Should this result stay up to the completion of the analysis, a credible argument could be made for a *pragmatic and technical approach* to legislative change in favour of security and at the expense of human rights regimes.

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Annex 1 Analytical process

Figure 1 Complete list of search keywords

administrative detention
arbitrary detention
arbitrary arrest
assault
biometrics
control order
data mining
data retention
data retrieval
data storage
data surveillance
data-mining
deliberate killing
deportation
disappearance
dragnet
enforced disappearance
enhanced interrogation techniques
expulsion
extradition
extrajudicial execution
extrajudicial killing
freeze assets
habeas corpus
Hawala
home confinement
illegal arrest
illegal detention
incommunicado
indefinite detention
information retrieval
interrogation techniques
kidnapping
military commissions
military tribunals
profiling
prolonged detention
refoulement
rendition
secret arrest
secret inquest/ secret inquiry

secret prison
seize accounts
shoot-to-kill
solitary confinement
summary killing
targeted killing
torture
video surveillance
watch list
wire-tapping

Figure 2 Complete list of data sources

USA

Institution	Sources George W. Bush	Source Barack Obama
President	http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ advanced search	http://www.whitehouse.gov/ simple search
Vice-president		
White House Press Secretary		
White House Chief of Staff		
National Security Advisor WH		
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	http://www.jcs.mil/ simple search	
Secretary of Defence	http://www.defense.gov/ advanced search http://www.defense.gov/home/top-leaders/ speeches and messages no search	
Secretary of State	http://2001-2009.state.gov/ advanced search	http://www.state.gov/ simple search, by type and topic
Attorney General	http://www.justice.gov/opa/press-releases.html browsing	http://www.justice.gov/ advanced search and by type
Secretary of the Interior	http://www.doi.gov/ simple search	http://www.doi.gov/ simple search and by type
Secretary of Homeland Security	http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/ by type	http://www.dhs.gov/ advanced search and by type
Director of Central Intelligence	https://www.cia.gov/ advanced search and by type	https://www.cia.gov/ advanced search and by type
Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation	http://www.fbi.gov/ advanced search and by type	http://www.fbi.gov/ advanced search and by type

EU

Institution	Sources
European Council	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=76&LANG=1&cmsid=347 documents http://www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings/presidency-conclusions.aspx?lang=en documents
European Council President	http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-president.aspx?lang=en documents
Council of the European Union	http://europa.eu/rapid/ advanced search http://www.consilium.europa.eu/applications/search/newsSearch.aspx?lang=EN&cmsid=377 simple search http://register.consilium.europa.eu/servlet/driver?page=Advanced&typ=&lang=EN&fc=REGAISEN&srm=25&md=100&ssf=DATE_DO CUMENT+DESC&cmsid=639 advanced search Security strategy http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=EN , http://www.eurunion.org/partner/euusterror/eurespusterror.htm
Council High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy/ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Solana/Search.aspx?id=246&lang=EN simple search and by type http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1847&lang=en documents
Presidencies	Luxembourg 2005, 1 http://www.eu2005.lu/en simple search Austria, 2006, 1 http://www.eu2006.at/en simple search Finland, 2006, 2 http://www.eu2006.fi advanced search not functional, by type Germany, 2007, 1 http://www.eu2007.de/en advanced search and types of Portugal, 2007, 2 http://www.ue2007.pt/UE/vEN/ simple search, advanced search Slovenia, 2008, 1 http://www.eu2008.si/en advanced search, by type France, 2008, 2 http://ue2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil.html simple search, by type Czech Republic, 2009, 1 http://www.eu2009.cz/en advanced search, by type Sweden, 2009, 2 http://www.se2009.eu/ advanced search, by type Spain, 2010, 1 http://www.eu2010.es/en advanced search, by type
EU Counter-	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1344&lang=en by type

Terrorism Coordinator	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=772&lang=en by type
Council General Affairs	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=72&LANG=1&cmsid=1851 documents
Council Foreign Affairs	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=78&LANG=1&cmsid=1850 documents
CFSP, CSDF	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=73&LANG=1&cmsid=359 documents http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=80&LANG=1&cmsid=985 documents
Council Justice and Home Affairs	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=86&LANG=1&cmsid=352 documents
European Commission	http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/query/advSearch_en.jsp advanced general search http://europa.eu/press_room/index_en.htm advanced general search http://europa.eu/news/index_en.htm advanced general search
European Commission President	http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/index_en.htm advanced general search, by type
DG External Relations	http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/search/googlesearch_en.htm simple search http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/index_en.htm documents
DG Justice, Freedom and Security	http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/com_select_en.htm by type

Russia

Institution	Sources
President	http://eng.kremlin.ru/ advanced search and by type
Prime Minister	http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/ simple search and by type
Secretary of the Security Council	http://www.scrf.gov.ru/ by type
Minister of Defence	http://www.mil.ru/eng/ by type
Minister of Foreign Affairs	http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/main_eng advanced search and by type
Minister of Justice	http://www.minjust.ru/ru/ by type
National Anti-Terror committee	http://www.nak.fsb.ru by type
Minister of Internal Affairs	http://eng.mvdrrf.ru by type
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)	http://svr.gov.ru/ by type
Federal Security Service (FSB)	http://www.fsb.ru/ by type
Rossiyskaya Gazeta	www.rg.ru
Public	www.public.ru

Figure 3 Attributes list

ID	Variable	Variable type	To be displayed	Source	Missing value	Categorical
2	Document group	Integer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	System		<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Document name	String	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	System		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7	Creation date	Date/Time	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	System		<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Number of coded segments	Integer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	System		<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Number of memos	Integer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	System		<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Author	String	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	System		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12	Bytes	Integer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	System		<input type="checkbox"/>
28	Country	String	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	User		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
29	Institution	String	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	User		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
30	Document Type	String	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	User		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
31	Date	Date/Time	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	User		<input type="checkbox"/>
32	Source	String	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	User		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
33	Receiver	String	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	User		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Figure 4 EU document group snapshot with attributes

Document...	Document n...	Creation date	Number of co...	Number o...	Author	Bytes	Country	Institution	Document Type	Date	Source	Receiver
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EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[U...	20.10.2010 11:47	4	0	Marinas	10068	EU	EU-Pres.	Statements	28.11.2005	official website	national public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[U...	20.10.2010 11:42	1	0	Marinas	9270	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	01.01.2005	official website	national public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.Lux[L...	18.10.2010 14:06	19	0	Marinas	15307	EU	EU-Pres.	Working paper	03.11.2005	official website	national politics
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.Lux[L...	18.10.2010 14:06	40	0	Marinas	244145	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	10.05.2005	official website	international public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[S...	18.10.2010 14:04	8	0	Marinas	2510	EU	EU-Pres.	Speech	24.06.2010	official website	national politics
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[S...	18.10.2010 14:03	6	0	Marinas	1815	EU	EU-Pres.	Speech	21.04.2010	official website	national politics
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[S...	18.10.2010 14:03	20	0	Marinas	3443	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	28.06.2010	official website	international media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[S...	18.10.2010 14:02	19	0	Marinas	8408	EU	EU-Pres.	Speech	16.06.2008	official website	international s...
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[S...	18.10.2010 14:02	5	0	Marinas	4310	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	18.01.2008	official website	national media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[S...	18.10.2010 14:01	11	0	Marinas	277659	EU	EU-Pres.	Declaration	10.06.2008	official website	international public
EU Presidencies	EU_Coun.EU_...	18.10.2010 14:01	23	0	Marinas	373024	EU	CEU	Release	23.06.2008	official website	national media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[G...	18.10.2010 13:59	2	0	Marinas	71417	EU	EU-Pres.	Statement	28.05.2007	official website	international public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[G...	18.10.2010 13:59	9	0	Marinas	142238	EU	EU-Pres.	Summit	29.04.2007	official website	international public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[G...	18.10.2010 13:57	4	0	Marinas	5913	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	15.02.2007	official website	national media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[G...	18.10.2010 13:57	6	0	Marinas	11361	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	24.01.2007	official website	national media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[G...	18.10.2010 13:56	14	0	Marinas	6357	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	15.01.2007	official website	national media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[F...	18.10.2010 13:56	3	0	Marinas	4830	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	27.11.2008	official website	national media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[F...	18.10.2010 13:55	7	0	Marinas	32714	EU	EU-Pres.	Note	05.11.2008	official website	national media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[C...	18.10.2010 13:53	7	0	Marinas	767	EU	EU-Pres.	Statement	22.01.2009	official website	international public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[C...	18.10.2010 13:52	8	0	Marinas	4469	EU	EU-Pres.	Statement	15.08.2008	official website	national public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[C...	18.10.2010 13:52	4	0	Marinas	2642	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	06.02.2009	official website	international media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[C...	18.10.2010 13:49	10	0	Marinas	2350	EU	EU-Pres.	Proclamation	15.08.2008	official website	national public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[C...	18.10.2010 13:48	4	0	Marinas	1083	EU	EU-Pres.	Conclusion	15.08.2008	official website	national public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[A...	18.10.2010 13:47	5	0	Marinas	6377	EU	EU-Pres.	Strategy paper	01.01.2006	official website	national public
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[A...	18.10.2010 13:47	4	0	Marinas	8415	EU	EU-Pres.	Statement	19.06.2006	official website	international p...
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[A...	18.10.2010 13:46	19	0	Marinas	8524	EU	EU-Pres.	Statement	21.02.2006	official website	international p...
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[A...	18.10.2010 13:46	16	0	Marinas	14091	EU	EU-Pres.	Speech	24.01.2006	official website	national politics
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[A...	18.10.2010 13:44	6	0	Marinas	3183	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	19.06.2006	official website	international media
EU Presidencies	EU_Pres.CO[A...	18.10.2010 13:44	6	0	Marinas	2632	EU	EU-Pres.	Release	24.04.2006	official website	national media

Figure 5 Codebook A

Code System		1457
[-] A1 Problem		0
[-] A1.1 problem (threat) identifier		80
[-] A1.2 problem (threat) attributes		79
[-] A1.3 problem policy categorisation		8
[-] A1.4 problem policy type		34
[-] A2 Victim		0
[-] A2.1 victim identifier		5
[-] A2.2 victim attributes		11
[-] A3 Cause (enemy)		0
[-] A3.1 cause identifier (enemy)		62
[-] A3.2 cause (enemy) attributes		42
[-] A3.3 cause (enemy) ideology		7
[-] A3.4 cause (enemy) objectives		17
[-] A4 Solution		0
[-] A4.1 solution type		97
[-] A4.2 solution grand strategy		28
[-] A4.3 solution alternative		16
[-] A4.4 solution identifier		217
[-] A4.5 solution justification		255
[-] A4.6 solution responsible		9
[-] B1 Frame centrality		230
[-] B2 Experiential commensurability		5
[-] B3 Narrative fidelity		115
[-] B4 Frame consistency		102
[-] B5 Empirical credibility		12
[-] B6 Credibility frame articulators		26
Sets		0

Figure 6 Codebook B

Code System		1457
[-] A1 Problem		201
[-] A2 Victim		16
[-] A3 Cause (enemy)		128
[-] A4 Solution		622
[-] B1 Frame centrality		0
[-] B1.1 ideas/principles		124
[-] B1.2 values		5
[-] political values		80
[-] personal values		21
[-] B2 Experiential commensurability		5
[-] B3 Narrative fidelity		0
[-] B3.1 historical events		36
[-] B3.2 collective memories		13
[-] B3.3 ideology		1
[-] B3.4 culture		65
[-] B4 Frame consistency		0
[-] B4.1 means adequacy		67
[-] B4.2 means success		34
[-] B4.3 scientific proof		1
[-] B5 Empirical credibility		12
[-] B6 Credibility frame articulators		0
[-] authority		9
[-] character		9
[-] expertise		3
[-] status		5
Sets		0

Annex 2 Sample US Document

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 13, 2001

President Issues Military Order

Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism

By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Findings.

- (a) International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.
- (b) In light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism, including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense in the national capital region, on the World Trade Center in New York, and on civilian aircraft such as in Pennsylvania, I proclaimed a national emergency on September 14, 2001 (Proc. 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks).
- (c) Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States Government.
- (d) The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its citizens, and to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect their nations and their citizens, from such further terrorist attacks depends in significant part upon using the United States Armed Forces to identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks.
- (e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.
- (f) Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this order, I find consistent with section 836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.
- (g) Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for

national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.

Sec. 2. Definition and Policy.

(a) The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing that:

(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,

(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;

(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor,

that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its

citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or

(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order;

and

(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this order.

(b) It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any individual subject to this order is detained in accordance with section 3, and, if the individual is to be tried, that such individual is tried only in accordance with section 4.

(c) It is further the policy of the United States that any individual subject to this order who is not already under the control of the Secretary of Defense but who is under the control of any other officer or agent of the United States or any State shall, upon delivery of a copy of such written determination to such officer or agent, forthwith be placed under the control of the Secretary of Defense.

Sec. 3. Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense. Any individual subject to this order shall be --

(a) detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the United States;

(b) treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria;

(c) afforded adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, and medical treatment;

(d) allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of such detention; and

(e) detained in accordance with such other conditions as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

Sec. 4. Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials of Individuals Subject to this Order.

(a) Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military commission for any

and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or death.

(b) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, including subsection (f) thereof, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and regulations, including orders for the appointment of one or more military commissions, as may be necessary to carry out subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Orders and regulations issued under subsection (b) of this section shall include, but not be limited to, rules for the conduct of the proceedings of military commissions, including pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, and qualifications of attorneys, which shall at a minimum provide for --

(1) military commissions to sit at any time and any place, consistent with such guidance regarding time and place as the Secretary of Defense may provide;

(2) a full and fair trial, with the military commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law;

(3) admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military commission (or instead, if any other member of the commission so requests at the time the presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the commission rendered at that time by a majority of the commission), have probative value to a reasonable person;

(4) in a manner consistent with the protection of information classified or classifiable under Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended, or any successor Executive Order, protected by statute or rule from unauthorized disclosure, or otherwise protected by law, (A) the handling of, admission into evidence of, and access to materials and information, and (B) the conduct, closure of, and access to proceedings;

(5) conduct of the prosecution by one or more attorneys designated by the Secretary of Defense and conduct of the defense by attorneys for the individual subject to this order;

(6) conviction only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present;

(7) sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being

present; and

(8) submission of the record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence, for review and final decision by me or by the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me for that purpose.

Sec. 5. Obligation of Other Agencies to Assist the Secretary of Defense.

Departments, agencies, entities, and officers of the United States shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, provide to the Secretary of Defense such assistance as he may request to implement this order.

Sec. 6. Additional Authorities of the Secretary of Defense.

(a) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and regulations as may be necessary to carry out any of the provisions of this order.

(b) The Secretary of Defense may perform any of his functions or duties, and may exercise any of the powers provided to him under this order (other than under section 4(c)(8) hereof) in accordance with section 113(d) of title 10, United States Code.

Sec. 7. Relationship to Other Law and Forums.

(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to --

(1) authorize the disclosure of state secrets to any person not otherwise authorized to have access to them;

(2) limit the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces or the power of the President to grant reprieves and pardons; or

(3) limit the lawful authority of the Secretary of Defense, any military commander, or any other officer or agent of the United States or of any State to detain or try any person who is not an individual subject to this order.

(b) With respect to any individual subject to this order --

(1) military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the individual; and

(2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.

(c) This order is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

(d) For purposes of this order, the term "State" includes any State, district, territory, or possession of the United States.

(e) I reserve the authority to direct the Secretary of Defense, at any time hereafter, to transfer to a governmental authority control of any individual subject to this order. Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the authority of any such governmental authority to prosecute any individual for whom control is transferred.

Sec. 8. Publication.

This order shall be published in the Federal Register.

GEORGE W. BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

November 13, 2001.

Return to this article at:

</news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html>

Annex 3 Analysis

Figure 1 Document image US




Figure 2 Comparison EU-USA solution justification

Code System	Country = EU	Country = USA
A4.5.1 legality	14,3%	28,4%
A4.5.2 judicial	2,9%	2,5%
A4.5.3 defence		3,1%
A4.5.4 prevention	17,1%	14,2%
A4.5.5 protection	15,7%	24,1%
A4.5.6 operational effectiveness	50,0%	15,4%
A4.5.7 exception		12,3%

Figure 3 Enemy attributes

Code System	Country = EU	Country = USA
unscrupulous		11,4%
vicious		
technologically advanced	57,1%	
adjusting		11,4%
bad		2,9%
brutal		5,7%
dangerous		14,3%
deadly		2,9%
determined		8,6%
evil		20,0%
new		2,9%
quick		2,9%
resentful		2,9%
unconstitutional		5,7%
unconventional	28,6%	2,9%
unreasonable		2,9%
violent	14,3%	2,9%
dreadful		

Figure 4 Solution attitude

Code System	Country = EU	Country = USA
A4.1.1 admittance	50,0%	17,5%
A4.1.2 approximation (with existing)	2,2%	5,0%
A4.1.3 minimisation (importance, damage)	13,0%	10,0%
A4.1.4 re-definition of law	4,3%	20,0%
A4.1.5 responsibility rejection (following orders)		2,5%
A4.1.7 abandonment	2,2%	15,0%
A4.1.6 condemnation	19,6%	
A4.1.8 denial	8,7%	30,0%

Figure 5 Narrative fidelity

Code System	Country = EU	Country = USA
B3.1 historical events	17,5%	44,9%
B3.2 collective memories	1,8%	20,4%
B3.4 culture	80,7%	34,7%

Figure 6 Political principles

Code System	Country = EU	Country = USA
☞ solidarity		
☞ responsibility to protect	6,6%	
☞ civil liberties	4,4%	40,6%
☞ constitution	1,1%	25,0%
☞ democracy	5,5%	9,4%
☞ equality		3,1%
☞ founding principles		3,1%
☞ fundamental rights	5,5%	
☞ fundamental values	2,2%	
☞ human rights	30,8%	6,3%
☞ international law	26,4%	
☞ prosperity		3,1%
☞ rule of law	17,6%	6,3%
☞ self-government		3,1%