

Chapter Summaries

1.1 A new arms build-up: Causes and alternatives (Andreas Heinemann-Grüder)

As early as towards the end of the last decade, there was an increase in global military expenditure, which, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, picked up markedly. The new rearmament is proof of a primacy of 'hard' national security as opposed to 'soft' and collective security. The build-up of arms is an expression of power ambitions, revisionist intentions, a depletion of customary integration ideologies, and democracy deficits or inside authoritarian regression. The scope of armament is decisively enforced by power ideologies, and not the available power resources as such. The unipolar world, the military 'overensuredness' of the United States and the double standards in the evaluation of weapons of mass destruction are rejected but at the same time imitated by rising powers. The unipolar world is unstable, but so is military multi-polarity. A potential way out would be security communities, led by coalitions of states that are prepared to disarm.

1.2 Empire versus world interior politics – Order models under peace policy scrutiny (Sabine Jaberg)

Political concepts of world order are moving between two poles: An empire led by the United States on the one hand, world interior politics within the framework of the United Nations on the other. Both raise peace policy expectations, with power-based *pax americana* in the one case, sustained civilization of the international system in the other. It is true that both also contain parts of violence in terms of personnel, structure and culture, but unlike the imperial approach, world interior politics strives to minimize them. This difference becomes particularly striking when dealing with military violence. While the empire has to constantly prove its dominance by a build-up of arms and periodical examples of its power, world interior politics builds on disarmament and arms control as well as cooperation and a reconciliation of interests. This is why it is regarded to be the framework model which is more conducive to peace.

1.3 Obsessed with invincibility – What kind of security does missile defense offer? (Reinhard Mutz and Götz Neuneck)

The planned US strategic missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic as well as reactions by Russia, allegedly counter measures, are burdening the relationship between Washington and Moscow. Experience gained in the East-West conflict on the stability of security policy is ignored. The unilateral build-up of arms threatens to undermine the arms control architecture in Europe. A military threat of ballistic missiles from the Middle East, however, has not yet emerged. On the other hand, Russian fears as to whether their nuclear strategic weapons will be long-term deterrents are not entirely unfounded. As the US project touches regional, rather than global security concerns in the medium term, it is a particular challenge to the Europeans to take a stand.

1.4 Beginning of the end or a new beginning for conventional arms control in Europe?(Hans-Joachim Schmidt and Wolfgang Zellner)

The non-ratification of the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed in 1999 by the NATO states has induced Russia to suspend its observance of the valid CFE-Treaty and to raise a number of additional demands. These are currently being negotiated between Russia and the United States in particular. If by Summer 2008 a solution cannot be found, it is to be feared that this will be the end of the CFE regime. This would not only destroy the key element of European arms control but could also be considered to be the failure of the claim of cooperative security in Europe—formulated after the end of East-West confrontation. Last but not least, the verification system, which led to transparency about conventionally armed forces by a regular exchange of information and inspections on-site, would no longer be upheld.

1.5 Global arms trade: Dangerous normality to the world of states (Bernhard Moltmann)

The risks of global arms trade are changing to veritable dangers to peace and security. The volume of arms traded has reached the level of Cold War times. Besides the United States and Russia, EU countries have established themselves as relevant suppliers. Unofficial markets supply persisting violent conflicts. The Middle East is among those countries who receive the largest amounts of weapons. India and China are modernizing their military capabilities with arms imports. An effort towards a global weapons trade treaty is controversial with some countries using arms transfers as foreign policy means and others striving for their limitation. The European Union is treating the reform of its EU Code of Conduct on arms exports just as half-heartedly. Nevertheless, it would be proof of wise politics to contain arms trade, an indicator for regional armament dynamics and potential wars.

1.6 The modernization of nuclear weapons and their proliferation – Two sides of a coin (Annette Schaper)

The nuclear weapons states have been optimizing their arsenals for nearly ten years instead of disarming further. A cut-off of nuclear weapons material production, still deemed possible in 1996, has moved beyond reach; a test ban treaty is still not in force. The effect of these trends is devastating. To more and more non-nuclear weapons states the nonproliferation regime appears to be a tool of the nuclear powers to cement the existing power structure. They increasingly question their obligation to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons. Up to now, there have only been a few states aspiring for nuclear weapons—at present Iran and North Korea. The explanation for this can be found in their isolation and aggressive foreign policy. When the nonproliferation regime continues to be eroded further, even more aspirants to nuclear weapons could appear who consider themselves threatened in their safety.

1.7 Space weapons and arms control – The competition for military dominance in space (Marcel Dickow)

With the end of the East-West conflict, most plans for space weapons disappeared into the drawers of defense bureaucracies. China's successful anti-satellite test in January 2007 and the shooting down of a disabled reconnaissance satellite by a missile launched from a US Navy ship in February 2008 have brought the topic back into the headlines. Only a few powers have comparable military competencies. But the number of states, whose civilian infrastructure depends on space technologies, is growing continuously. They would be defenseless against anti-satellite attacks. A remedy would be a comprehensive ban of any warfare in space. Under reference to its own national interests, the United States is opposing the start of negotiations on the containment of the dangers of an arms race in space.

1.8 The 'unleashed' state? The Federal Republic of Germany is taking shelter from its citizens (Hans J. Gießmann)

Any observers of the many attempts by the Federal Government to introduce new laws for domestic security will be asking themselves in view of more and more unrestrained political demands what the purpose of all that shall be. There is no discernable change in the threat originating from terrorism, which could be the reason for even tighter laws and measures than before. Critics purport that it is not a matter of defense against terror but rather that the Federal Republic is in the process of turning into an Orwellian state. In fact, it seems that solely the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) offers hopes for a reasonable balance of freedom and security as its lawyers have scrapped some of the particularly critical initiatives at the very last instance. Can the domestic state founded on the rule of law only fight against outside threats when it questions its constitutional foundations?

1.9 Arms build-up in poor states? Differentiation of armament dynamics in Sub Saharan Africa (Marc von Boemcken)

Excessive state armament and militarization is not the biggest problem of societies in Africa. On the contrary, in many countries there is a lack of both an effective and democratically legitimized monopoly of power. This is due to a lack of resources but also to clientelist regimes, who understand 'security' merely as private ownership. Security sector reform as development policy strategy ought to therefore aim at building up a competent state which is capable of containing private conflict dynamics. Additionally, the state has to understand this security as a public good.

1.10 The European Union: A civilizing power in global security policy? (Matthias Dembinski and Bruno Schoch)

In a world that is changing in terms of power policy, the European Union is searching for its role. In the scientific debate, three positions have taken hold: Military power, civil power, and 'non-power'. Despite a growing militarization which can be observed since 2003, the European Union will remain a civilian power. This is not due to the normative foundations, which EU countries have agreed on, as previously assumed, but to the institutional nature of the European Union. This institutional nature represents the different measures of value in the member states. The Enlargement of the European Union has contributed to further pluralization. The European Union is not suited for a military power. It should concentrate on its strengths: long-term stabilization and modernization of endangered regions. For this, there is no alternative but to cooperate with the United Nations and other international organizations.

1.11 Does international law prohibit the withdrawal from treaties governing the limitation of armament? (Hans-Joachim Heintze)

International law has changed fundamentally. The previously sacrosanct sovereignty of states was put into perspective by the prohibition of violence, and peace obligation became the central norm. Armament control as well as disarmament contributes fundamentally to this. Treaties under international law are the result of a consensus, which mirrors political interests; if these change, treaties are revoked or suspended. This contribution exemplifies problems in international law by way of three treaties (strategic weapons, conventional weapons in Europe, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons).

1.12 "From the ice they are freed": Arms control according to Bush (Harald Müller)

Under the Bush administration, the US-American unilateralism has disrupted arms control worldwide. However, growing superpower rivalries, the risk of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction and an increasing interdependence make cooperation in terms of security policy necessary. There are harbingers of change. Even in the US security establishment, a movement in favor of nuclear disarmament has formed. We can expect a moderate armaments policy from all presidential candidates. Great Britain has corroborated its goal of complete nuclear disarmament. There are still many obstacles that need to be overcome, but nuclear disarmament is possible if there is the political will. A ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and a verification system would be first decisive steps in the right direction.

2.1 Risks of climate change (Volker Teichert and Marie Velarde-Velarde de Noack)

The damage caused by climate change does not equally affect all states, they affect some more than others. Risks are storm tides and flooding which, *inter alia*, lead to food shortages. At the same time there is, as a consequence of consumer habits in the industrial countries, growing conflict about the distribution of food. Additionally, climate change may increase migration risks worldwide. Risks of failing states and destabilization processes will not be contained without police and military capacities. This contribution discusses the consequences for global environmental politics; the authors argue in favor of a world organization for the environment and development as well as for a world climate fund.

2.2 Conflict-laden climate change – A security problem? (Michael Brzoska)

Climate change as a problem for peace and security has a highly mobilizing effect. However, this assessment also harbors dangers. The deterministic prognosis of future migration risks and violent conflicts can, in industrialized countries, abet to exaggerated isolation, and possibly a build-up of arms. Relevant studies on climate change from 2007 show that methodological foundations on which forecasts of consequences in terms of peace and security policy from climate change are made are not very reliable. Such prognoses can therefore, for the present, only be taken as warnings, not as secure knowledge. It is necessary to conduct more research on the connection between climate change and violent conflict and to strengthen adaptability and resistibility of those regions that are particularly endangered by climate change.

2.3 The arctic region – From cooperation to confrontation? (Daniel Lambach)

In the arctic region, climate change leads to a thinner ice sheet, which leads to a greater accessibility of new resources and shipping routes, making them more economically usable. There is the threat of emerging conflict around these new resources, namely where maritime borders have not yet been clearly defined. It is true that at present, there is a web of cooperative relationships which includes all riparian states to the Arctic Circle; however, these agreements are mostly limited to environmental issues. A resilient regime, which could also regulate new and future defense-, and territorial conflicts, does not exist to date. In view of this regulation deficit, it is to be expected that the existing diplomatic and economic conflicts will intensify further. A military dispute, however, is not to be expected in the foreseeable future, nor is a *détente* of the situation.

2.4 Hot war for cool water? Consequences of climate change for water conflicts (Ulrich Ratsch and Florence Mège)

There have not yet been any water wars, but there has been violent conflict on sub-state level. Climate change will aggravate water scarcity and distribution conflicts in some regions of the world. One example of the risk of a non-peaceful conflict resolution is the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river system, the Indus as well as the Nile River and the semi-arid and arid areas in Africa. For the states in the Indus- and Nile basin, water wars are highly improbable, even in the future. The combination of seasonal scarcity on the one hand and great floods on the other will, however, increase migration from Bangladesh to India (West-Bengal and Assam) and thus the danger of local clashes. Intra-state fights for water sources in dry areas, in particular in Africa, will become more probable.

2.5 On the conflict potential of renewable energies (Hans Diefenbacher)

Both the increasing international competition for non-renewable resources that are increasingly of short supply and the political claim to limit climate change in the long term to an increase in the average temperature by two degrees centigrade, leads to the necessity of expanding the use of renewable energies on a global scale. In many cases, in which these energy sources—or the technology necessary for their production—turn from a ‘green’ niche technology into a global commodity, new and intensive conflict can arise. *Inter alia*, new fields of competition can emerge, for instance between staple food and energy production. By taking the conflict around biomass as an example, this contribution depicts such conflicts and shows possible ways out of the dilemma: an increase in energy efficiency, strict certification for the cultivation of biomass for use as energy source, the rationalization of energy policy, and a different behavior of consumers.

3.1 Unstable authoritarianism: Countries and regions of crisis (Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach)

Apart from ‘fragile states’, there is a second category of crisis countries in international policy, which at present finds markedly less attention. This category consists of authoritarian regimes in threshold countries with a highly mobilized society, which suffer from severe latent or open conflict. These countries are highly important for regional security as a civil war would have great consequences for their neighboring countries. At the same time, long-term stability of their rule model can be questioned, as state authority is often concentrated on individuals or small groups. Can an opening up towards democracy bring peace or will it merely lead to the emergence of hidden conflicts? How are external actors supposed to behave towards these countries?

3.2 Violent conflict and authoritarian statehood in Pakistan (Jochen Hippler)

Pakistan is plagued by a violent crisis, which weighs down the transition to democracy following the elections of February 2008. One has to differentiate between four conflicts: Violence between Sunnite and Shiite extremists; a latent civil war situation in Karachi, which has eased off markedly, however; an uprising in Balochistan, and a situation of terrorism and civil war in the north-western province—interlinked with Afghanistan and the ‘war on terror’—which threatens to spill over into other regions. These conflicts are connected to the asymmetrical character of the state, whose political and social institutions are weak, whereas its military is overdeveloped. A hardly functioning but authoritarian state machinery is imposed on the heterogeneous Pakistani society.

3.3 Zimbabwe between persistence and change: Instabilities of autocratic rule (Steffen Stübig)

For years, the Zimbabwean population has been suffering from a severe economic crisis. Opposition and critical engagement are punished with repression. In view of the manipulation and the fraud in the elections of 2008, it is probable that Robert Mugabe will remain President. However, the elections are of great importance for the future of the country. The outcome of the elections could weaken the position of the ageing president and thus create room for change. Mugabe’s reputation is also declining among the government elite; the rejection of the regime by the population is growing. International sanctions have in the most part been unsuccessful, neighboring countries are (still) showing solidarity with Mugabe.

3.4 Egypt between pressure to reform and ability to persist (Henner Fürtig)

The regime in Egypt, which has been in power since 1952, is one of the most experienced in the Arab world. Since 1990, it has reacted to external pressure to democratize with a mock liberalization, which the West accepted due to pragmatic considerations. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the arrangement ran into short-term difficulties as Egypt feared that the United States would—in the sense of prevention—from then on, value genuine democratization higher than loyalty. In 2003, an unparalleled process of political reform was initiated, which culminated in a multi-candidate election for the Presidency and a revision of the constitution. However, arrangements were made to prevent a real danger to the balance of power. Western or European governments should therefore no longer limit their efforts to exert influence on the regime but should form a new relationship with the opposition, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, and should support important institutions of civil society.

3.5 Control of power in the gray area between authoritarianism and democratic constitutional state – The example of Colombia (Sabine Kurtenbach)

Since the end of the Cold War, a minimum of public security has increasingly been created in the context of formal-democratic systems or of political systems that have become more democratic. The arising difficulties are discussed under the question of 'liberalization versus stabilization'. Taking Colombia, its long internal war and its formal-democratic system of government as an example, the difficulties in dealing with politicization and criminalization of violence and the changing internal and international context are shown. In Colombia, some approaches towards the treatment of complex phenomena of violence within the framework of existing democratic latitudes have been developed in the past few years. These experiences are important beyond Colombia.

3.6 Nationality conflicts in China: Causes and approaches (Thomas Heberer)

Tibetan protests and the conflict in Tibet entered the headlines in Spring 2008. This contribution puts the conflict into proportion with Chinese policy towards nationalities. The indigenous peoples have, for a long time, been considered as 'barbarians'. The core conflict consists in the lack of real autonomy, forced modernization which threatens ethnic identity, and unequal treatment of cultures. Traditional hierarchy concepts dominate, according to which the Han have 'culture' and the political goal consists of the 'cultivation' of non-Han-peoples. Discontent is growing as a consequence of interference in traditions, customs, and religious beliefs of minorities. This contribution opts for an official recognition of the minority issue, positive discrimination and a federalization.