 Print version
Statements
The Gaza-War – Latest Chapter in a Never-Ending Conflict. Extract from a Presentation at the “Launch of the Peace Report 2009. Key Challenges for European Policy: The Case of Palestine”, Hosted by ISIS Europe, 23 July 2009, Brussels | 07/23/2009
by Dr. Margret Johannsen
Like many of today’s asymmetrical wars, the violent conflict between Israel and the Palestinians will not be resolved by military means. In this case, victory for one side and defeat for the other are inconceivable because the international community will not tolerate a military solution where the law of the strongest prevails. Experience has shown that despite its clear supremacy Israel is not in a position to force the Palestinians to accept its conditions for an end to the conflict.
The restraint that Israel, as part of the West, has had to observe after 1967 has in turn enabled the Palestinians to persevere and resist the occupation. Under the prevailing conditions and with the conflict under constant scrutiny, the Palestinians could not be defeated. On the contrary, the international community not only provided legitimacy to their cause, but saw to it that they somehow survived the many catastrophes that befell them. On the other hand, Israel for its part has not had to defeat the Palestinians and win this war in order to expand its control of territory. From the outset of the conflict, the seizure of territory by administrative means has been the civilian equivalent of territorial expansion by the means of war. Between wars, the bulldozer took the place of the tank.
In light of these observations, this conflict could just simmer on, with sporadic violent eruptions and mass media coverage, and its powerful symbolism continuing to supply energy to other conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. The alternative to such intractability is a Palestinian state, where Palestinians can actively exercise self-determination as a people. Statehood alone, through a declaration of independence and international recognition, will not suffice. It is widely agreed that for a Palestinian state to be viable it needs a functioning economy, geographic contiguity and control of its own borders. The absence of any of these features will make it vulnerable and dependant and will threaten its long-term survival. As a failing state it will fall short of establishing peaceful relationships with its neighbours. What is maybe not so evident is that the Palestinian state also needs legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Palestinian self-determination in a comprehensive sense that includes popular legitimacy must be considered the core of a strategy to end the conflict.
Unfortunately, the split between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and two authoritarian regimes in the making in both territories not only prevent a stable ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, but also spell disaster for a solution to the Palestine conflict that is deserving of the name. A negotiated ceasefire would require a commitment by Hamas to enforce a halt to the rocket fire from the Gaza Strip and to the smuggling of weapons, in return for an end to Israel's military activity in the Gaza Strip and a lifting of the siege. However, the prospects even for such a modest agreement to be stable are dim as long as the Palestinian schism continues and both sides, Israel and Hamas, have different and contradictory goals and expectations concerning a ceasefire.
The ceasefire of 2008 is a case in point. It was doomed short-lived because it was designed by the two parties not as part of a strategic dialogue aiming at establishing trust and advancing a political settlement, but to promote totally conflicting strategic interests. Israel sought to prevent the security tension in the Gaza sphere from obstructing the political process that, as part of the effort to promote a comprehensive settlement, aimed at delaying the advance of Hamas towards the Palestinian political helm. Hamas for its part hoped the lull would ease the consolidation of its hold on Gaza, essentially at the expense of Israel's political partner – the Fatah-led PA.
So even if the parties can agree to renew the ceasefire of 2008 a future agreement will not prevent yet another escalation as long as the split between Hamas and Fatah continues. Because the split causes both factions to use the Israeli-Palestinian arena as a battleground for their power struggle. The detention of civilians in the West Bank by the Preventive Security Services and the Palestinian General Intelligence may convince Israel that those services, whose training and mission are defined by the war on terror, can prevent Palestinian violence against Israel. But as these practices target the Palestinian opposition only, they are also part of the Palestinian power struggle. And the same is true in Gaza. Rockets from the Strip may land on Israeli soil, but politically they target President Abbas. They aim to withhold from him any achievement in the negotiations with Israel and thereby weaken the PA.
However, power sharing is not only required for a Palestinian leadership to be strong enough to “deliver” what Israel values most, i.e. security. To accept Palestinian statehood only under the condition that bothersome actors remain outside of the state’s structures is a formula for failure. The reasonable recommendation to the international community would therefore be to encourage Palestinian unity and then engage Hamas as an integral part of a legitimate Palestinian government – not unconditionally, but endorsement of the two-state solution in line with the Arab League's Peace Plan of 2002/2007 would not be asking too much from Hamas – or too little for Israel. Such acceptance would include financial support, even if Hamas remains on the EU’s list of terror organizations. A Palestinian unity government and a negotiated ceasefire with Israel, taken together, could facilitate a process leading to the removal of Hamas’ political wing from this list.
Goodbye, European Army – A Comment on the Consequences of the German Constitutional Court’s Ruling on the Lisbon Treaty | 07/08/2009
by Dr. Hans-Georg Ehrhart
The German Constitutional Court has decided! The political
tenor of the unanimous ruling will have long-term repercussions.
It remains to be seen whether this is really the end of the
European integration process so dear to European federalists. It
is safe to say though, that its effects on the future development of
a common foreign and security policy and its defence related aspects are immense. What does the ruling say? The judgement from Karlsruhe clarifies that, on the one hand, Germany is allowed to abide by the Lisbon Treaty and, on the other hand, Berlin will not, as a result, abdicate Germany’s sovereign right to take political decisions. There is an unalienable core of tasks and duties that constitutes the state’s sovereignty. Among them are questions of religion, budget, law and order, and peace and war.
Does it follow from this that the vision of a European Federation, the United States of Europe, has to be abandoned? The classic question of the final status or political “finalité” of the EU goes this way: Shall the Union develop towards a federal state and hence also in the direction of an integrated European army or shall it remain an entity sui generis being de facto what has been called by the Constitutional Court in its Maastricht judgment an “association of states” (“Staatenverbindung”) - something between a confederation and a federation? The answer from Karlsruhe clearly favours the second model. However, the ruling does not entirely block the possibility of a merging of German statehood into a European federation. It does, however, erect such high barriers as to seem insurmountable even in less eurosceptic times, namely a new constitution in which Germany’s renunciation of sovereignty is explicitly enshrined and this is then approved by the German people, the real sovereign.
What are the consequences for the build-up of a European Army? Recently there has been much talk in German political parties about the necessity of a European Army. Chancellor Angela Merkel, for instance, commented in an interview given to the German tabloid Bild in March 2007: “We have to come closer to a common European Army.” The Social Democrats (SPD) and the Liberals (FDP) also argued in favour of this goal in their respective manifestos for the election to the European Parliament in June 2009. The ideas linked to this approach are quite plausible. War within the Union would definitely become impossible. European integration was already a question of war and peace for former chancellors from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl. Preserving peace was, and still is, one of the main rationales for the “process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe”, as the preamble to the Treaty of the European Union puts it. Today, as the thought of war between EU member states has become totally absurd, another rationale has come to the fore. Europe is to become more influential and engaged in world affairs. In the new global age, it should become capable of acting on the same footing as the old and new great powers. This goal is out of reach for any single member state. Hence, they have to pool their capabilities and pursue a common political approach, especially when facing a global financial and economic crisis.
If European politicians really want to stay the course towards these two goals of peace and enhanced effectiveness in world affairs, they have to do it within the framework of a confederation of states. There are enough construction sites still lying idle: the civilian and military capability gaps, the absent common armament market, the still-rudimentary export control regime, the deficient comprehensive approach or the lack of coordination of national defence planning, to mention only a few. Petty jealousies prevail. In case of doubt, states decide in favour of their all-too-often parochially defined national interests.
The Lisbon Treaty offers new opportunities, especially in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy. If it comes into force, there will be the new position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will be, at the same time, Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for External Affairs. In addition, there will be a European External Action Service consisting of foreign and security experts from the Commission, the Council and seconded personnel from the national capitals. Finally the EU Member States will pursue the forging of a common defence policy, involving, to mention just a few areas, the assistance clause in case of aggression against a member state on its territory, the obligation to improve military capabilities, and the possibility of entering into a so-called “permanent structured cooperation, i.e., that some member states will be allowed to go further in their defence cooperation than other ones.
All this, by the way, will be possible without direct control of the European Parliament whose role is limited to asking questions and making recommendations. It is the Council – that is, the sovereign nation states - which decides unanimously. With respect to so called out-of-area missions of the Bundeswehr, the German Constitutional Court already ruled in 1994 that the German Bundestag first has to give a mandate. Since then the Bundeswehr has been called the “Army of the Parliament”. And so it will be in future. The EU has indeed created a set of planning and conduct capabilities for civilian and military crisis management. In addition, since 2003, it has launched two dozen crisis management operations, six of them of a military nature. But Brussels does not dispose over its own forces. It is the member states which offer the civilian and military assets on a case-by-case basis.
In future as well, Brussels will not be able to decide on whether or not to send German soldiers to a military mission, because the EU will never become a full-fledged federation. The Bundestag will never relinquish its core competence in questions of war and peace. What remains possible and desirable, given the challenges of a globalised world, is increasing cooperation in the area of security and defence. However, the vision of an integrated European army of the United States of Europe has faded away as a result of the judgment of the German Constitutional Court.
Bienvenue Grande Nation: The return of France in NATO’s military integrated structures | 03/27/2009
by Dr. Hans-Georg Ehrhart
The return of France into NATO’s integrated military command structures can be called a second Saint-Malo. In 1998 the British-French Declaration of Saint-Malo paved the way for the establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
Now the relationship between NATO and the EU could change profoundly. From a military point of view the reintegration of France is not a big gain, since Paris is already amongst the most active NATO members and one of the biggest troop providers in NATO-led military operations. The real importance of this change lies in its political consequences. The former approach of nearly obsessive isolation could make way for a transatlantic partnership corresponding to the ideal type of a two-pillar alliance once cherished by former US President John F. Kennedy and now supported by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
Anyway, Paris will earn a privileged place in NATO. Its demand for high-ranking command posts has indeed been satisfied: Paris will take over two of them. The first one is the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia. On the one hand, this post enables France to play a key role in the conceptual development and the military transformation of the alliance. On the other hand, it is less important than the Allied Command Operations (ACO), which is responsible for the planning, command and control of military operations. Secondly, France will take over the Regional Commando in Lisbon, which encompasses the NATO Response Force (NRF) headquarters and a satellite centre. Paris, which has a special interest in the field of space-based intelligence, has been actively engaged in the NRF since its outset. Now, France’s military establishment should be happy with the 900 new jobs in Brussels, while its armament industry – politically close to Sarkozy – hopes for new orders to reinforce the ESDP and a better access to the American market.
From France’s perspective, its return in the integrated command has not completed the necessary reform of NATO’s obsolete structures. In future, France will be represented again in the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), but a participation in the Nuclear Planning Group is excluded. In spite of being a growing financial burden, the “force de frappe” is still an indispensable symbol of national sovereignty. Paris will in any case continue to strive for a permanent European headquarters capable of planning and conducting autonomous military operations. An initiative by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg was brusquely rejected by the US and the UK in 2003. Five years later serious deliberations on this contentious topic have started. The strongest opposition to such project seems now to come from London, not the USA.
The French White Book of 2008 mentions three other reform ideas. Firstly, NATO should primarily concentrate on Art. 5 activities, but also act in the field of crisis management, excluding civilian security and humanitarian operations. Secondly, NATO’s reform should lead to a better task-sharing between Americans and Europeans to be reflected in an adapted organisational structure. Thirdly, NATO should improve its planning procedures and rationalise its command structures.
By returning in NATO’s military structures, Paris has made a bet on the future. A final assessment of this decision will depend on whether and how NATO’s reform will proceed, and whether this will have positive repercussions on the ESDP. In the end, Paris is interested in strategic political goals, rather than in military questions:
* France wants to have more influence in a changing NATO in order to have a better control over this process;
* The ESDP shall evolve into an equal partner within NATO in order to recalibrate the alliance in favour of the EU;
* The EU, NATO and the US shall act to the benefit of the global order, which could lead to the creation of an informal directorate.
It is beyond doubt that the relations between France and the US have become much more dynamic. The operative challenges and the new threats are of course important drivers for this development. But even more significant is the idea that an effective European defence can be better built up within rather than outside NATO. It is only with this approach that the deep mistrust of “atlanticist” EU members such as the UK and Poland towards France’s purposes can be overcome.
At the same time there are still many uncertainties and open questions. With regard to France-US bilateral relations, for instance, how long will the honeymoon last? And what is to be expected for the future? As far as the EU and NATO are concerned, what concrete effects will the French reintegration into NATO’s military structures have on NATO itself? How will it influence the ongoing deliberations on a new strategic concept? Which institutional reforms are likely to be agreed upon? Considering the differing European interests within the alliance, will it be possible to create a European pillar? If so, what would this mean for NATO’s decision making process? Is it possible and desirable to assimilate the different roles of the EU and NATO? Is it possible to define a sort of task-sharing between NATO and the EU, and, if so, how should it look like? Finally, are France’s European partners able and willing to support Nicolas Sarkozy’s ambitious plans?
Some of these questions may soon find an answer, other not. The relations between France and NATO will certainly not be free from tension in the future. Nevertheless the return of France into NATO’s integrated military structures opens a window of opportunity to reform NATO and make it more suitable to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
End Annapolis – Try a new approach | 11/27/08
by Dr. Margret Johannsen
While on her twentieth flight to the Middle East in early November, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters that Israel and the Palestinians had never before come so close to resolving the conflict. Presumably, the parties to the conflict do not share this assessment. In the yearlong negotiations following the Annapolis summit on 27 November 2007 there has been no progress towards an agreement which would put the establishment of a Palestinian state within reach. To be sure, both the Palestinian President Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister declared their commitment to dividing the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. However, in negotiating thorny issues, which will have to be resolved in a peace treaty – establishing a border, distribution of water resources, the evacuation of settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the rights of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons – no progress deserving of this label has been made. Let’s hope that the next U.S. government will face this reality and change course.
The failure of Annapolis should not come as a surprise. The built-in mistakes of the previous negotiation formats – Oslo (1993) and the Road Map (2003) – ought to have been warning enough. In order to make headway towards a settlement, both sides would have had to believe in the willingness of the adversary to make peace. Only then would they have been able to make the often cited “painful compromises”. However, neither negotiation framework provided for a mechanism to foil attempts of sabotage nor did they allow for mediation or arbitration. In Annapolis, these deficits recurred when the Israeli approach prevailed in implementing a future peace treaty according to the specifications of the Road Map. To make matters worse, one half of the Palestinians, whom Hamas represents, were excluded from the political process. In order to pave the way for a Palestinian state, the PA was obligated to bring the Palestinian paramilitary militias under its control so as to prevent attacks on Israel. On the other side, Israel would have had to freeze all settlement activity in the West Bank, dismantle settlement outposts and begin removing over 600 road blocks, which constrain life beyond all bearing and paralyze the economy. One year after Annapolis neither side has fulfilled these obligations, which were to facilitate the process of creating an independent Palestinian state.
Sure enough, the Israeli army tore down a few road blocks. Nonetheless, new ones emerged in other places, and the building of settlements continued and was even accelerated in and around Jerusalem. Given the continued land robbery, President Abbas could hardly dare to make concessions in the most sensitive issues, above all East-Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state or the claim to the refugees’ right of return, without running the risk of being perceived as a puppet of Israel and its almighty patron. On the other side, the Ramallah-based PA did indeed cooperate with Israel in hunting down activist and supporters of the opposing Hamas and closed down its charitable institutions. Yet the PA is far from establishing its monopoly of force in the West Bank.
However, the USA showed neither Israel nor the PA the red card. Since 9/11 a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite its high symbolic value which holds such destructive mobilization potential, seems to be of secondary importance. In its global war against terror, the U.S. government evidently prioritizes defeating the Islamist faction of the Palestinian liberation movements. Hamas, for that matter, ruling in the Gaza Strip, is treated by Israel as the de facto government of a quasi-enemy state and is coming to terms with the misery of the blockade. A year ago, the leaders who gathered in Annapolis may still have believed in the feasibility of the two-state solution. Do they expect in earnest that three states – Israel, East-Palestine (Fatahland) and West-Palestine (Hamastan) will achieve a sustainable solution to the struggle over the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea? Washington's new champion of change should know better. The Europeans should see that he does by intensifying their contacts with the liberal establishment and bringing their own ideas into the Middle East Quartet, which has of late been eclipsed by Washington. The EU has the chance to make an impact on Obama’s Mideast policy-in-progress only if it rises to the challenge and dares a new beginning, e.g. putting on the table a blueprint for a final settlement, which provides for a contiguous and viable Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and committing to oversee its implementation on the ground. There is not much time left for the EU. It should make use of it now.
|
